On Campus: China Expert Analyzes China-Taiwan Risk for War

(Welcome to all the readers from Simon World, MeiZhongTai, and Naruwan Formosa!)

One of the benefits of being on an Ivy League campus is that we do get a lot of great speakers.

A few days ago, there was a talk in the East Asian Studies department, and I went.  Here are my notes, since some of you gentle readers have expressed interest in what the speaker had to say about the China-Taiwan standoff, which is admittedly one of the main issues of this blog.

Let me introduce the speaker then: Dr. Yu Maochun, PhD from Berkeley, and professor of history at the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland.  He's been a consultant and analyst for various news outlets (such as Jim Lehrer's NewsHour and the Voice of America), his expertise in Asian affairs is frequently called upon in Washington, and he is also known for various publications such as his book, OSS in China: Prelude to the Cold War.

For those of you gentle readers who are in a hurry and can't read the entire really long entry:

“Will China Attack Taiwan?  Calculating the Risk for War.”

 6 factors to consider

Note that these factors are dialectical, constantly in flux and interrelated – they can be interdependent and contradictory.

Yu also stated several times that the lecture in no way reflects the official position of the State Department, the Pentagon, or any government or official entity.  The views expressed are entirely his own. My note: my note-taking skills aren’t so good that I could transcribe Yu word for word the entire hour, but I’ve done the best I can to note down his turns of phrase and the core of his arguments. And now having said that, here’s the lecture:

 {For your bloggy convenience, the main factors are listed here for you; the actual details follow in the main body of this post.}

1. Historical Pattern:  China’s historical propensity to use force to solve geopolitical problems.
2. China’s New Security Agenda
3. High-Level Power Struggles Within Chinese Government Elite
4. Cross-Strait Economic Engagement
5. Taiwanese Democracy
6. The United States

For those gentle readers who want the full lecture notes, here they are:

Factor 1: Historical Pattern:  China’s historical propensity to use force to solve geopolitical problems.

A good book to consider on the subject: Alastair Iain Johnston’s Cultural Realism – focus on China’s strategic culture

China considers force as the ultimate recourse – “coercive defense” and “coercive diplomacy.”

See for instance, Allen Whiting’s analyses of China’s actions in the Korean War and also in 8 conflicts (2 major wars and 6 smaller conflicts):

• Korean War
• Vietnam War
• 1960—India
• 1969—USSR
• 1979—Vietnam
• 1954—Taiwan (the “First Taiwan Strait Crisis”)
• 1958—Taiwan (the “Second Taiwan Strait Crisis”)
• 1995-96 missile firings (the “Third Taiwan Strait Crisis”)

China does not really care whether the United States will be involved or not once China itself has decided to go into armed situations.

China is prone to use force to:

~Intimidate others

~Solve diplomatic standoffs

Why this propensity?

(1) The PLA (People’s Liberation Army) does not have much success in island fights

            Case in point: the 1949-50 conflict against Quemoy, held by the KMT

            Well-known fiasco for the PLA: Lost estimated 10,000 troops (3 regiments)

            The PLA high command still remembers this

            The incident is highly studies in PLA training

(2) US support for Taiwan defense

            In particular, the US Navy

            Overall strategy here is deterrence through force; this has been the US strategy for the last several decades

Factor 2: China’s New Security Agenda

Note that previously:

(1) Taiwan was only a parochial leftover from 1949

(2) China has in the past ceded and given up territories and lands larger in size than Taiwan: e.g., land given to Myanmar/Burma

The Taiwan issue is not about Chinese global power and dominance.

More important is China’s global economic power, with such factors as:

~Rivalry with US and Japan

~Frantic Chinese search for oil

~Chinese focus on protecting its economic interests.

à Taiwan is not as important as this sort of thing,

Contradictory effects of this new agenda of protecting economic interests:

~Diluted the Taiwan issue and delayed the use of force.

~Framed the Taiwan issue as preparation for China waging a bigger war against other adversaries, and so increased the tendency to use force

~Create a need for a quick end to the Taiwan issue

See too Taiwan as a strategic point:

~A “choke point” in Asian geography

~A strategic location for Chinese hegemony over Asia

à This is more important to China than “unification” with the island, and PLA analysts desperately want to obtain the island

Factor 3: High-Level Power Struggles Within Chinese Government Elite

“War is an extension of domestic policies,” and this statement is especially true for China.

The people in the political high command are using Taiwan for their own purposes.  Consider:

~Nationalism {MM notes: recent China-Japan friction fits in this pattern also}

~Note the CCP’s (Chinese Communist Party) increasingly desperate attempt to cling to legitimacy (this had previously been based on Marxism; nowadays not so clear)

See too the pernicious truth: Chinese high politicians come from many factions:

~Everyone cares more about economic development than anything else

~Most of them do not care that much about Taiwan per se, but nobody wants to be seen as soft on this issue

            ~There is basically a competition to see who can be more hawkish

            ~For ex., Jiang Zemin had a policy of 8 Points on Taiwan, but this was generally seen as being soft, so he toughened up because of partisan attacks on this issue and this led to the missile firings of the 1995-6 crisis.

There is, overall, a lot of posturing.

National leaders are often preoccupied with their own political survival.

Factor 4: Cross-Strait Economic Engagement

There are robust and increasing economic ties between China and Taiwan.

2 ways to look at this engagement:

~ Will it help along Chinese freedom and democracy?

~Is it a Trojan Horse for Taiwan?

Several key studies have indicated:

~The quarrel between Beijing and Taipei does not seem linked to their economic interdependence

~Even while there is increasing economic connection, there is also increasing distrust.

An aside:

Recently a PLA general listed 6 consequences that would happen if China attacked Taiwan:

Number one on the list: the loss of the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing

Number two: the loss of the 2010 World’s Fair in Shanghai

Note that there is no mention on that list of Taiwan economic issues.

But the cross-strait economic engagement is really about Taiwanese money and investment going to China, not the other way around.  Chinese investment in Taiwan is minuscule.

~Taiwan is more dependent on China than the other way around

~This imbalance leads to Chinese leverage

~There are currently an estimated 500,000 Taiwanese businessmen in China

~China can use this to influence Taiwanese politics

~Case in point: Before the 2004 presidential elections in Taiwan, China started arresting Taiwanese businessmen and charging them with being spies.

At the same time, Taiwanese businessmen like doing business with China because they get all sorts of “goodies” – tax breaks, etc.

But if the PRC decides to use force, it will do so at any cost.

Factor 5: Taiwanese Democracy

Consider the Taiwanese democracy in matters of war and peace.

There is a misunderstanding in China that there are only a small number of Taiwanese “splittists” who are led by Chen, Lu, DPP, etc.

But poll after poll after poll has shown that 70-80% of the Taiwanese want the status quo, neither immediate unification nor formal independence.

Taiwanese democracy is very vibrant.  Could it influence China?

A case in point: the SARS Crisis

~The World Health Organization was not even allowed to touch Taiwan

~Taiwanese leaders were very upset and made some bold statements

~These statements were not protested in China—there was nobody to protest, because the difference between the two governments was so clear: recall Beijing’s obvious neglect of the SARS issue.

An aside for case study—Chinese populace may not be as eager for war as the high command’s rhetoric might suggest:

~A PLA general recently went on TV talking about invading Taiwan, and the format of the TV show encouraged viewers to call in questions.

~Viewer calls were not rah-rah in support of the general; instead the calls were asking about the effects of an invasion on domestic food prices and other similar concerns.

~Signs of passive disapproval on the part of the populace?

Remember also that China’s state-run media constantly demonizes Taiwanese democracy.

Taiwan democratic impact—very powerful:

~The KMT is out, no longer in power

~Beijing would be much happier if the KMT ruled—this would allow elite politics, with elite politicians on either side making deals without having to engage in a political process (i.e., deal with voters, vox populi, etc.)

~Now with the KMT out, there can be no dealmaking among elites (and this is why Lee Teng-hui is so hated in China; he encouraged the idea of referendums in Taiwan)

Beijing is afraid that if democracy in Taiwan continues, it will never get the island.

Factor 6: The United States

Increasingly in Washington, Taiwan is seen more as a bargaining chip between Washington and Beijing than a moral issue.

~The Taiwan issue distracts from hard-core issues like arms, human rights, etc.

~Without Taiwan, Sino-US ties would be much more intense.

But Taiwan is no longer docile.  It is democratic, with genuine vox populi, and its wants recognition, inclusion in the international community, etc.  The White House does not always like this.

The US policy of “strategic ambiguity”:

~Historically very dangerous

~Consists in large part of making wishy-washy statements –and such statements are bad:

            ~For example, see the US and USSR in the Korean War

            ~It was unclear what would trigger responses; there was no clear statement of “if you do A, we’ll do B.”

~Us policy of making it unclear what it would do if a conflict in the Taiwan Strait occurred – meant to keep both China and Taiwan in check.

~Strategic ambiguity in the Taiwan Strait situation is “like a Ford Pinto”:  There are serious design flaws.  It might have worked for 50 years already, but it runs into a problem, it could blow up.

(Yu noted laughingly that after he made this analogy on Lehrer's NewsHour, he soon got an unhappy phone call from the Ford Company!)

Conclusion:

Some of the factors discussed are intrinsic to the Chinese political system.  These internal factors will be hard to change.

The external elements are changeable and may be more important.  For instance:

~ Need for US’s unambiguous support for democracy in Asia

~Upholding of US defense pledge to Taiwan and the defense umbrella

The Q-and-A:

Q: What should the US do?

A: Get rid of strategic ambiguity.  For instance, during the Clinton Administration, Clinton talked all cozy with Beijing, but then he sent aircraft carriers into the Taiwan Strait, which confused and angered Beijing.  It was like, “What?!”

Bush has been much clearer on the Taiwan issue.  He went on CBS and said “whatever it takes to defend Taiwan.”

Ambiguity leads to cantankerous, provocative, hostile action from the other side meant to test your resolve and see what you will do.  This increases tension.

Note too that strategic ambiguity is also meant to restrain Taiwan.

Q: When you talk about China using force, what kind of force do you mean?

A: There are various kinds of force.  For instance, the use of a blockade of Taiwan.

But we play this thing as if it were a chessboard, a checkerboard, forgetting that Taiwan is a democracy.

See too the element of theatrics and semantics in the whole thing.

What if Taiwan declared independence tomorrow?  What would happen?  (Almost nothing?)

Regardless of name (“Republic of China,” “Taiwan,” etc.), Taiwan is an autonomous state.

Q:  Is US-China trade a factor in war?

A:  China cares about leverage, and in economic terms with the US, it has some, but would it impede US action?  I don’t know.  I’m not an expert in economics.

If China did go to war, the damage to the Chinese economy would be much bigger (than to the US economy).

Q:  What about the PLA’s perspective?

A:  Analyzing PLA generals’ (anti-Taiwan) diatribes is fun!

The question is about the PLA and its assessment of capabilities.  Do they know they are no match for the US?

~There have been some advances with submarines, but not enough to match the US Navy in the Pacific, where we have overwhelming dominance.

~There is a lot of PLA rhetoric and PLA leaders making speeches.  Some of their assumptions about Chinese power are unconscious.

~For instance, a misconception on the PLA’s part is a tendency to think that democracy (as in the US) leads to decline.  Specifically, the thoughts that:

            (a) The US is “weak” or “declining” or “decadent”

            (b) The US is casualty-averse.

On being casualty-averse:

A while back, a PLA general made a comment about “nuking a few US cities.”  His thought was that if that happened, the US would not be willing to engage militarily in Asia because we are casualty-averse.

That is, casualty-averse meaning that if we (the US) sustain some casualties, we will quickly disengage to prevent further casualties.  But remember, Japan thought the same thing before Pearl Harbor! 

Q: Would Taiwan welcome a democratic China?

A:   There is a sense of agnosticism in Taiwan; a lot of people don’t care.  They think they want to mind their own business and China to mind its own.

But if there is no democracy in China, there will never be peace.  Still, democracy isn’t a panacea or cure for everything, and you have to be careful about ultra-nationalism.

The Taiwanese government should actively encourage Chinese democracy.  President Chen’s 2000 presidential inauguration speech about the benefits of Taiwanese democracy was brilliant.  So we should encourage democracy in China also.  Taiwan has much to gain by it.

Taiwanese businessmen, by the way, overwhelmingly support the status quo, because they get a lot of goodies over there in China – privileges and tax breaks and things like that.

Q:  Would the US welcome peaceful unification (between China and Taiwan)?

A:  I’ll be honest: a lot of guys in DC would be SO HAPPY if the Taiwan issue were gone.

US-China talks keep going back to Taiwan even when they’re supposed to be about North Korea or whatever.  For example, if the US and China have scheduled a one-hour meeting to talk about North Korea, the Chinese will spend 45 minutes of that hour talking about Taiwan.  That leaves only 15 minutes for North Korea!

Remember, there is the danger of Byzantine politics in Beijing and their effects of hawkishness where Taiwan is concerned.  Sometimes the rhetoric is even more important than the reality when we’re dealing with this.

Q:  What about the situation in greater Asia?

A: About the recent US-Japan defense communiqué:

It’s good because it clarifies that the US and Japan would do if China did invade Taiwan.  Clarity is good; reduces strategic ambiguity.

Japan and the US have a defense pact.  But there’s also China-Japan friction going on, and that is serious stuff.  We don’t want Japan to alone beef up its military, because that would lead to a chain reaction of China, North Korea, etc. increasing their militaries also.

Beijing is unhappy about the US-Japan alliance.  That alliance is very important.

Also, India and Russia are afraid of Chinese expansion.  And Beijing is afraid of an India-US alliance, so it made some overtures to India in the UN about its bid for a seat on the Security Council.

As for the recent Russia-China war games, I hear that China actually paid for the Russians to go there.

links: digg this    del.icio.us    technorati    reddit